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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, Salt Lake
City Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

vs.

)
)
)

JON B. BUXTON,

)

Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF
Case No. 880401-CA
Priority II

)

JURISDICTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c) (1953 as amended) and Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) whereby a
defendant in a criminal action may take an appeal to the
Utah Court of Appeals from a final judgment of conviction of
a Class B Misdemeanor by a Circuit Court.

Final judgment

and conviction were rendered by the Honorable Judge Paul G.
Grant, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake
County, Utah.
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of the
Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for
Count I, Driving Under the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Section 105 of the Salt Lake City Traffic
Code (1984); Count II, Obedience to Semaphore at Crosswalk,
an infraction, in violation of Section 084 of the Salt Lake
City Traffic Code (1984); and Count III, Open Container in

Vehicle, an infraction, in violation of Section 109 of the
Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984).

The

defendant/appellant, represented by his attorney of records,
Charles F. Loyd, Jr., was found guilty through a jury trial.
The court sentenced the defendant on Count I to 180 days
jail and $1100.00 fines and fees, with 170 days jail
suspended upon twelve months probation to the court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Defendant-Buxtonfs Statement of Issues are inadequate;
therefore, the plaintiff-City frames the issues as follows:
1.

Does Utah law, regarding driving under the

influence of alcohol, create an obligation on the arresting
Officer to inform the charged drunk driver of a right to
have an independent chemical test?
2.

If such an obligation to inform an arrested person

of his discretionary right to have an independent chemical
test exists, does the failure to inform an arrested person
require the suppression of an otherwise valid admissible
intoxilyzer test?
3.

In Utah, is it a defense to the crime of driving

under the influence of alcohol that if the arrested drunk
driver alleges he was driving as a matter "necessity"
because he was driving an ill friend to the hospital?
4.

If the affirmative "necessity" defense to a

criminal charge exists in Utah, must a trial judge submit
that issue to the jury when the criminal defendant has
failed to present any credible evidence:

(a)

That there existed no reasonable alternative

to driving under the influence; and
(b)

The risk of drunk driving exceeded the risk

sought to be avoided?
5.

Does the "Harmless Error" principle bar defendant-

Buxton f s claim?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
18-1-702 Colo, Rev. Statutes (1973)
(1)

Unless inconsistent with other provisions of

section 18-1-703 to 18-1-707, defining justifiable use of
physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct
which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable
and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency
measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which
is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or
developed through no conduct of the actor, and which is of
sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary standards of
intelligence and morality the desirability and urgency of
avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of
avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute
defining the offense in issue.
(2)

The necessity and justifiability of conduct under

subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon
considerations pertaining only to the morality and
advisability of the statute, either in its general

application or with respect to its application to a
particular class of cases arising thereunder.

When evidence

relating to the defense of justification under this section
is offered by the defendant, before it is submitted for the
consideration of the jury, the court shall first rule as a
matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances
would, of established, constitute a justification.
Constitution of Utah, Article V, Section 1.
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall
be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative,
the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to
either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44.10.
Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or d r u g —
Number of tests--Refusal--Warning report—Hearing,
revocation of license--Appeal--Person incapable of refusalResults of test available—Who may give test—Evidence.
(6)(a)

The person to be tested may, at his own

expense, have a physician of his own choice administer a
chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered
at the direction of a peace officer.
(b)

The failure or inability to obtain the additional

test does not affect admissibility of the results of the

test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or
preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer.
(c)

The additional test shall be subsequent to the

test or tests administered at the direction of a peace
officer,
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-105.
Common law crimes abolished.--Common law crimes are
abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this
code, other applicable statute or ordinance.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-302. Compulsion.-(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in
the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by
the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical
force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened
force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would
not have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section
shall be unavailable to a person who intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a situation in
which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
(3) A married woman is not entitled by reason of the
presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or
to any defense of compulsion except as in subsection (1)
provided.

Utah Code Annotated, 76-2-401(5)
Justification as defense—When allowed.--Conduct which
is justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense
based on the conduct.

The defense of justification may be

claimed:
•

*

(5)

*

When the actor's conduct is justified for any

other reason under the laws of this state.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

The Implied Consent Law, Section 41-6-44.10

of the Utah Code does not create a right to be informed of
an independent chemical test in a criminal proceeding.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to
suppress the defendant's intoxilyzer test.
POINT II.

The defendant, in a criminal proceeding for

DUI, does not have a right to be informed of the
availability of an independent chemical test and, therefore,
failure to inform the defendant of this right does not
require the suppression of the alleged defendant's
intoxilyzer test.
POINT III.

Utah law does not recognize the defense of

"necessity"; that is, an intoxicated driver is not excused
from criminal culpability because he chose voluntarily to
drive an ill person to the hospital.

If such a defense is

to be created, it should be done by the legislature and not
judicial fiat.

In Utah, the legislature specifically omitted adopting
the model criminal code providing for such a defense.

Thus,

if any common law affirmative defense existed, it was
modified by the comprehensive scheme of criminal law adopted
by the legislature.

Further, this Court cannot reasonably

construe the affirmative defenses in the statute regarding
"justification" or "compulsion" to include a defense against
the plain meaning and wording of the statutes.

Therefore,

this case should be affirmed and not remanded for a new
trial.
POINT IV.

Even if Utah recognized the defense of

"necessity," such defense is not automatically submitted to
the jury.

First, the trial court judge has an obligation to

evaluate the evidence to assure that the prima facie
elements of that defense have been established by the
defendant.
In the case at bar, the defendant failed to make such a
prima facie showing; specifically, he failed to present
credible evidence that there existed no reasonable
alternative to driving under the influence.

The unrebutted

evidence clearly demonstrated that there were other sober
drivers available, there were other ways of assisting the
ill individual, such as phoning for emergency help or the
defendant could have stopped at the nearest phone booth for
assistance.

Further, the elements of risk avoidance preponderated
clearly in favor of non-drunk driving.

The risk and damage

to innumerable innocent drivers and pedestrians by
defendant-Buxtonfs conduct far outweighed the benefit to be
achieved in assisting the ill person to the hospital.
Thus, two of the three essential elements were not
established and the Judge properly excluded the defense from
being submitted to the jury.
POINT V.

The evidence when viewed as a whole does not

erode the confidence in the appropriateness of the jury
conviction.

The defendant has failed to present a case

where a different outcome would be reasonably likely.

Thus,

any failure to instruct was harmless error, even if the
defense of "necessity" is available in Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The fact, when viewed in a light most favorably to
upholding the jury verdict are as follows:
1.

On February 13, 1988, Officer Kirk of the Salt Lake

City Police Department observed a blue Chevette vehicle
heading north on State Street in Salt Lake City at a high
rate of speed.

(R. 19.)

Officer Kirk placed his motorcycle

behind the vehicle and clocked the vehicle at 45 m.p.h. in a
30 m.p.h. zone.

(R. 20.)

The vehicle ran a red light at

600 South and State Street.
2.

(R. 20.)

Officer Kirk testified that the traffic was very

heavy and that there were numerous pedestrians present.
21. )

(R.

3.

Officer Kirk pulled the vehicle over, approached

the vehicle and bent down at the front driverf s window to
question the driver.

He noticed the odor or alcohol was

strong on defendant-Buxton1s breath.

(R. 22.)

As Mr.

Buxton exited the vehicle, Officer Kirk noticed his unsteady
balance and slurred speech.
4.

(R. 22, 23.).

Based upon these initial observations, Officer Kirk

determined that the driver defendant-Buxton, may be driving
under the influence of alcohol and asked him to submit to
several field sobriety tests.

Officer Kirk asked Mr. Buxton

to perform a heel-to-toe test, a finger to nose test, a hand
clap test and a finger count test.

Mr. Buxton's performance

on each of these tests was deemed to be unsatisfactory and
the Officer believed that Mr. Buxton was under the influence
of alcohol.
5.

(R. 24, 25.)

The field sobriety tests, which Officer Kirk

administered to defendant-Buxton were also observed by
Officer Cheaver of the Salt Lake City Police Department. In
Officer Cheaver's opinion, the defendant Buxton was driving
under the influence of alcohol.
6.

(R. 38.)

Officer Kirk placed defendant-Buxton under arrest

for driving under the influence of alcohol.

Following that

arrest, the Officer asked Mr. Buxton if he would consent to
taking a breath test.
would.

(R. 27.)

Defendant-Buxton indicated that he

7.

Officer Cheaver transported defendant-Buxton to the

police station, where an intoxilyzer test was administered.
The intoxilyzer test measured a breath-alcohol content on
defendant's breath of ,202.
8.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, R. 85.)

During the police investigation, defendant-Buxton

claimed he was driving as a matter of "necessity" or
"justification;" that is, a friend became ill at a party and
defendant was driving him to the hospital.

However, the

facts were undisputed that there were at least two sober
individuals at the party, the host and a woman named Wanda.
At least the host could have driven the ill person by
leaving his children with the other adult person or the
defendant.

Alternatively, the host could have driven the

ill person, with his two children to the hospital, in a safe
and prudent manner.
9.

(R. 86, 87.)

Defendant-Buxton elected to drive the ill person,

but passed numerous phone booths on State Street prior to
his arrest.

Thus, he failed to stop and call for emergency

assistance from an ambulance or the police, even though he
had ample opportunity to do so.

(R. 55; defendant's

admission, R. 102.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT CANNOT RAISE ANY CLAIM TO
A RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE
AVAILABILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT CHEMICAL
TEST IN THE APPEAL OF THE DEFENDANT'S
CRIMINAL DUI TRIAL.

A.

THE ESSENCE OF EQUAL PROTECTION IS
INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION. THE
DEFENDANT-BUXTON HAS FAILED TO
DEMONSTRATE AN IRRATIONAL,
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS
CLASSIFICATION TO RAISE AN EQUAL
PROTECTION ARGUMENT.

The Utah statute permitting an arrested person to have
an independent chemical test, at his own expense, was
expressly premised on the legislative determination that
such a test or the failure to take a test would not affect
the admissibility of the government test.

The law expressly

states:
The failure or inability to obtain the
additional test does not affect admissibility
of the results of the test or tests taken at
the direction of a peace officer, or preclude
or delay these tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer.
41-6-44.10(6)(b) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended.)
Defendant-Buxton seeks to avoid this clear legislative
statement barring an exclusionary rule by invoking the catch
words of "equal protection".

The defendant incorrectly

suggests some invidious discrimination between classes of
individuals by suggesting that, even though no duty to give
notice may be required under the Utah statute, one must be
inferred because notice is given as part of an inducement to
encourage those who have refused to submit to the test to do
so.

Buxton's Brief, at p. 6-7.

In making this assertion, defendant-Buxtonfs Brief is
conspicuously lacking of any rationale as to how defendantBuxton or any other person is prejudiced.

It also lacks any

analysis as to why a class of individuals, who submit to the
test, are similarly situated to those who refuse and need
encouragement to take the breathalyzer, so they will not
lose their driving privileges for a year.
On the issue of classification, our Court has observed:
Discrimination is the essence of
classification and does violence to the
Constitution only when the balance upon which
it is founded is unreasonable. . . . Our
function is to determine whether an enactment
operates equally on all persons similarly
situated. . . .
If it does not, then a
differentiation would be without a reasonable
basis . . .
Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 160
(Utah 1949); see Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035,
1037 (Utah 1975).
It is somewhat difficult to discuss the issue of
reasonable classifications when defendant-Buxton, in
challenging the classification, has not even addressed the
matter.

However, the Court's attention is drawn to several

obvious justifications for treating those who voluntarily
submit to a test, as required by law, differently from those
who initially are reticent to comply or refuse.
First, it must be noted that this process treats all
persons who are similarly situated the same; that is, all
persons who initially refuse to submit to the test are given

the standard warning.

This admonition advises them of the

civil consequences of losing their driving privileges for
one year.

Further, as an inducement to these intransigent

individuals, they are informed that they may have their own
physicians conduct a test, so long as this second test
results in no delay in the administration of the official
3
test.
Obviously, one purpose of this standard admonition is
to verify compliance with the State law regarding
documentation of a refusal, so that the civil procedure of
revoking a license for a year can be established.
Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 449, 351 (Utah 1979).

See
Another

obvious purpose is to encourage compliance with testing
requests and the concerns that may be in the minds of
inebriated individuals.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court can take
judicial notice that, after arrest for driving under the
influence and an initial refusal, many inebriated
individuals are nervous, hostile, not operating at peak
rationality, and suspicious of submitting to tests.

Such

assurances of the availability of private testing is
rationally related to a legitimate government objective of
encouraging compliance.
2
See DUI report form, attached as Appendix A, at page 2
thereof.
3
See full text of the notice annexed as Appendix "A".

On the other hand, those who submit to the test
voluntarily and without objection, constitute a separate
classification.

They simply are not in need of the

encouragement and assistance required for those who refuse,
in order to obtain the law's objective:

submission to the

alcohol testing.
Buxton has ignored the law's purpose and objective
encouraging compliance.

He, thereby, has attempted to turn

it on its head by implicitly arguing the law's purpose is to
give "all" arrestees notice of this option to have a second
private test and manufacture out of whole cloth an equal
protection argument.

However, when viewed in light of the

law's clear purpose and intent, Mr. Buxton's classification
argument fails because all similarly situated persons are
treated identically.
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that defendant's
implicit assumption that all arrestees are of one
classification is erroneous.

There exists a legitimate and

rational basis to distinguish between cooperative
individuals and those who do not initially agree to submit
to an alcohol test.

Further, it fulfills the express

legislative directive that the optional private test does
not affect the government's test admissibility.
Defendant-Buxton has simply failed to carry his burden
or persuasion to demonstrate that, even if the
classification issue were relevant, it is arbitrary,

capricious or unreasonable.

Having failed, this equal

protection claim should be dismissed.
B.

THE LEGISLATIVELY PERMITTED PRIVATE
CHEMICAL TEST IS FOR PROTECTION OF
CIVIL DRIVING PRIVILEGES; THEREFORE, IF ANY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
ARE INFERRED, THEY MAY ONLY BE
RAISED IN A CIVIL LICENSE
REVOCATION PROCEEDING AND DO NOT
AFFECT CRIMINAL TRIALS.

Even assuming arguendo that the provisions of the State
statute give defendant a right to notice of his privileges
to have an independent chemical test, that right may only be
asserted in a civil proceeding held to determine the status
of the defendant's driving privileges.

Our courts made this

clear in a case involving the claimed right to have counsel
under the Sixth Amendment, before having blood (evidence)
seized from his person.

The Court construed this exact

section under consideration by the Court and held:
The foregoing statutory provisions [41-644.10 U.C.A.], as they pertain to the implied
consent matters, are obviously civil in
nature as opposed to criminal, since they are
devoid of criminal sanctions and provide only
for the revocation of the privilege of
operating a motor vehicle.
Cavaness v. Cox, id. at p. 351. Thus, the Court ruled the
provisions inapplicable to suppressing test results in a
criminal proceeding.

In analyzing this issue, the Utah

Supreme Court observed:
Applying the foregoing principles to the
facts of this case, plaintiff has no standing
to raise the question of the
constitutionality since this case involves

only a civil matter where neither the
question of the right to counsel in a
criminal case nor the question of
admissibility of evidence as to the refusal
or the results of a chemical test are at
issue before the Court.
Id. p. 352.
Thus, any claimed right of notice to independent
chemical test would, at best, only be applicable in a civil
proceeding to determine the status of the defendant' s
driver's license.

Therefore, it is erroneous for the

defendant to claim denial of his right to a notice in a
civil proceeding as a basis of overturning the jury's
verdict in this criminal case.
POINT II.
THE FAILURE TO INFORM A DEFENDANT OF A
RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT CHEMICAL TEST IS
NOT A VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS.
The defendant asserts that he was denied due process of
law because he was not informed of his claimed "right" to
have an independent chemical test.

This position asserts

that there is a right to an independent chemical test to the
criminal DUI proceeding and that failure to inform this
4
defendant of that right was a denial of due process.
Simply because a right exists, it is not incumbent that
police officers inform the defendant of that right before
proceeding with their investigation and arrest of the
4
Defendant-Buxton Brief, Point I, pp. 3-7.)

defendant.

The United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth

v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) addressed the right of a
defendant to be informed that he has a right to refuse a
consensual search before his consent is obtained.

The Court

stated:
One alternative that would go far toward
proving that the subject of a search did know
he had a right to refuse consent would be to
advise him of that right before eliciting his
consent. That, however, is a suggestion that
has been almost universally repudiated by
both federal and state courts, and, we think,
rightly so. For it would be thoroughly
impractical to impose on the normal consent
search the detailed requirements of an
effective warning. Consent searches are part
of the standard investigatory techniques of
law enforcement agencies.
Id. p. 231.
This same rational should be applied in the instant
case.

In Schneckloth the Supreme Court decided that the

defendant did not need to be informed of his right to refuse
a search.

In the instant case, the defendant's consent to a

search (obtaining body substances for chemical analysis of
blood/alcohol content) had already been implied by the law.
Informing him of his right to take an additional chemical
test would have no legal impact on his decision to submit to
the test requested by the officer.
Rather, it is clear that this proposed police
disclosure requirement would not alter his statutory duty to
submit to the test or protect some inherent or express
constitutional right, like the right to remain silent.

It

would not serve to ensure the reliability or validity of the
police test.

The scientific and legal foundation for

admissibility are well established in law and do not include
the necessity of a separate confirmatory test.

See 41-6-

44.10(6)(b).
Defendant-Buxton*s brief simply lacks credible
rationale justifying his proposed procedural trap.

Neither

does he explain how it would in any way promote justice or
advance the discovery of truth in a criminal proceeding.
Admittedly, it would provide defense lawyers with a
procedural loophole by creating mechanism to exclude
otherwise relevant, material and admissible evidence.
However, it would do so at great cost to justice.
The exclusionary rule is a drastic and harsh remedy
because it excludes relevant, material and otherwise
admissible evidence.

In fact, our legislature expressly

stated it should not apply.

41-6-44.10(6)(b) Utah Code Ann.

Consequently, it frequently results in the guilty
individuals being freed to protect more important core
constitutional rights.

As such, it should be exercised only
5
to advance the most compelling public policy interests.
Defendant-Buxton cited no case upholding his position and
has failed to articulate any important societal and justice

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 430 U.S. 388
(1971) J. Burger Dissent p. 413-416.
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the Court stated:
Turning Uw u;;a second question ot whether or
not respondent's refusal may be excused by
reason of the failure of the arresting
officer to advise respondent that he could
obtain an additional test at his own expense,
pursuant to section 13354, subdivision (b),
we note that neither section 13353 or secti on
13354 purports to require the arresting
officer to advise the driver that an
. additional test is available at his expense
Other than the Miranda warning prior to
police interrogation, section 13353
subdivision (a)lf specifies the only warning
required to be given, namely, that the driver
Defendant cites People v. Koual, 124 N.W.2d 274 (Mich,
1963) and State v. Creson, 576 P. 2d 814 (Or.Ct.App. Ic^8 ) in
support of his contention that dismissal of the case c-r
exclusion of the breath test results is the appropriate
remedy for failure to inform a defendant of the availability
of an independent alcohol test. Both of these cases are
distinguishable because both involved state statutes which
expressly required this notice to be given. The officers
had not given the required notice and the courts therefore
dismissed the case or suppressed the breath test results.
Utah does i 10 t require notice of the independent test to be
given and therefore these sanctions would be Inappropriate

"be told that his failure to submit to such a
chemical test will result in the suspension
of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle
for a period of six months." Therefore, we
may reasonably conclude that the Legislature
did not intend to impose the further
requirement that the arresting officer advise
the driver of the availability of an addition
test at his own expense. . . .
Nor do we believe that principles of due
process or equity require that persons in
respondent's position be advised by law
enforcement officers that additional tests
may be taken at their own expense.
[A]11 that due process requires in the
preservation of the rights of such persons is
the availability of an opportunity for
defendant to obtain a timely sampling of his
blood in the manner required by law.
7
Id. p. 903 (Emphasis added).
2.

Alaska.

The Supreme Court of Alaska has also

addressed the issue of a defendant's right to be informed of
the ability to take an independent chemical test.
State of Alaska, 604 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1979).

Palmer v.

In this case,

the defendant was convicted in an Alaska District Court of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol.

On appeal, the defendant argued that his

conviction should be overturned and his breathalyzer test
results should be suppressed because he was not informed of

7
California Code §13353-4 are verbally identical to §41-644.10(6) Utah Code Ann., 1953 which allows a defendant to
have an independent test and §41-6-44.10(2)(a) outlining the
duty to warn a defendant of the consequences of a refusal.
Neither requires police to inform a defendant of a right to
have an independent chemical test.
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Palmer w a s not advised of his righ t to obtain
ai :i Independent test, and he now contends that
the results of the breathalyzer examination
w e r e therefore inadmissible. The statute,
however, contains no requirement that: such
advice be given, and we are not persuaded
that it is required by any provision of the
state o r federal constitution.
•
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New Mexico has also considered whether

the law requires that a defendant sr.n; d b e informed ot hi s
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Utah _Cqde A n n , , 1953 a s amended (emphasis a d d e d ) .

Alaska f s 1 aw, li ke California and Utah, permits a private
test, but does not require police to inform a defendant as
condition to administering a government test.

Notwithstanding this broader language and evidence
indicating that New Mexico's usual practice was to give such
a notice, the Supreme Court held a notice was not
statutorily or constitutionally required.

The Court

reasoned:
New Mexico's statute does not expressly
instruct the police or the test administrator
to warn the suspect. There is no overriding
constitutional requirement that it must be so
construed.
•

• *

We further hold that there is no
constitutional reason, either state or
federal, which confers upon the accused a
right to be expressly told that he has an
opportunity, under Sec. 64-22-2.9, supra, to
have additional tests performed by any
qualified person of his choosing.
Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
Thus, even when it has been the historic practice to
inform individuals of the privilege to have an independent
chemical test, the law does not require such a warning.
Individuals are presumed to know the law and the failure to
delineate all defense options, such as an opportunity to
have a private second test, does not result in a denial of
fundamental fairness or due process.
Defendant-Buxton has cited no contrary authority and it
is respectfully submitted that the thoughtful precedence of
Alaska, California and New Mexico should be followed.
Results of defendantf s breath test should not be excluded
under the new proposed exclusionary rule; defendant-Buxton*s

affirmed.
PC):

N

" :: .

. .rtn LAW Lur
F NECESSITY.

, 1 III, i "MP KNSF

n

judicially
cases,

ingraft trie cerense c:

Iiieits cxi s* - ^o TT+--- - ^tatuter

lf

c :mp^ . .-. «'. Y

Cour !:: "

*.

*

.

themselves, t o sucl
T

> suggest: thai thi.

*--. -> ^ .

i

H . ^ ^ ^ ^ in,pr^i-r, r Q r c

. w-^-u»e^ _-. _

1

.5115= t: uction.
f

juxbioi

applicatxo.

• * - = » .

' JstificatJc:

-i J ,-: ~ - •.- -.

unrecoyuxwcw

* :ases that

-

r e c o g n i z e this d e i ^ . j ^
on

L:> r an I.w

necessity

n.i..

oxiuciLiGiib where an *.i.„, , .

^ its
^

.0 coerc

d o a n o t h e r w i s e crimiria.. act because ^ - •"".-> u s e -r rh: «. •>:

No

SUCH

i d C t ^ -iif- wven suygttb^.. ,

' ^s case.

U t a h c a s ^ I ^w h a s rejected the request
'

'

r.o Ingraft: t h e

•-•--.,

Harding,

Further,

:.

.. L a t e

o3 b r . 2a „; -. \ u idh i '^d i. ; ; State v. Turtle ,

v,

"- ~ V ?,i 1

6 3 ^ (Ut.ah 1 9 8 6 ) ; S tate v. Alexander, :-J7 r. 2d 8 - ; lUtan
]

9

).

S e e -,-.• : '; D : -.i^fendant" :•; Brief: §§76-2-302 and 76-2-401
U t a h Code Anr,
'• •

The commentators also specifically note that the
defense of compulsion is not the equivalent of the defense
of "necessity."

One such work clearly states:

. . • With the defense of necessity, the
pressure must come from the physical forces
of nature storms, privations) rather than
from other human beings. (When the pressure
is from human beings, the defense, if
applicable, is called duress [or compulsion]
rather than necessity),
W. LaFave and Scott Criminal Law, §50, p. 381.
Under the "justification" defense, the only language
remotely helpful to defendant-Buxton is §76-2-401(5), which
allows the defense:
When the actor's conduct is justified for any
other reason under the laws of this state.
Defendant-Buxton cites no Utah "law" to meet this test,
but simply invites the Court to judicially legislate the
defense by calling it Utah common-law and by citing a
"minority" rule followed in New York*

Alternatively, he

argues from a section of the model criminal code and
commentaries on it, which were not adopted in Utah.
Rather than assume the legislature intended to adopt
the non-included "avoidance of evil" or "harm defense,"
appropriate principles of statutory construction require the
opposite conclusion.

If the section on "avoidance of evil"

See defendant-Buxtonfs brief at p. 13.
See defendant's brief at p. 11; cf. the model code §3.02
quoted at p. 11 of defendant's brief with 76-2-401.

Die: 1:1: :i B " I lecessi ty defer ise" ; ms del i berately excluded from
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this Court to create a defense, which the legislature
intentionally chose not to do.

Constitution of Utah,

Article V, §1; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 57 P. 1 (Utah
1899); Smith v. Schwartz, 60 P. 305 (Utah 1899).
Since 76-2-401 contains no language which recognizes
the "necessity" defense and does not contain any language to
support an interpretation which would reasonably allow the
Court to construe the existence of such a defense,
defendant-Buxton's claim must be rejected.
POINT IV.
THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT MADE OUT THE
REQUISITE ELEMENTS TO WARRANT SUBMISSION
OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE TO A JURY.
Even if this Court recognizes the "necessity" defense
to a drunk driving offense, the jury verdict should not be
overturned because the defendant failed to meet his burden
to establish the prima facie elements of this affirmative
defense.
Every state, which recognizes the necessity defense,
requires essentially the same prima facie elements to be
factually established by the defendant as an affirmative
defense, before it may be submitted to the jury.

This test

is not a subjective test; rather it is an objective one
which the trial judge determines, initially, before
submitting it to the jury.

These elements and points are

clearly set forth in a well reasoned case from Alaska, as
follows:

1.
significant: evil;
.-a-r. »n!C" -..jive b**^*

t:.;.- t;r& ha;*; avoided.
Anchorage

Cleveland v. Municipality of
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runows:

The defendant's brief as to the relative
harmfulness of the harm avoided and the harm
done does not control... however. It is for
the court, not the defendant, to weigh the
relative harmfulness of the two alternatives;
to allow the defense the court must conclude
that the harm done by the defendant in
choosing the one alternative was less than
the harm which would have been done if he had
chosen the other.
W. LaFave and Scott: Criminal Law, §50 p „ 386,
Some str;v^

-

11 1 lit",' ii" i i M pI I I *

example, Colorado s e u i-.ji'.i in Its criminal -^>:t- ..^e
eleipep'c -! -• ! oceduxe of judicial review required before
t l le

e f e i i s e nil \y lx.' Mil niii i \ 1 i M I I

IIi

1111 y

law p: ;vi«ies:

( x ,i Unless inconsistent wit other provisions
of section 18-1-703 to 18-1-707, defining
justifiable use of physical force, or with
some other provision of law, conduct which

"I'll in 11

would otherwise constitute an offense is
justifiable and not criminal when it is
necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an
imminent public or private injury which is
about to occur by reason of a situation
occasioned or developed through no conduct of
the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity
that, according to ordinary standards of
intelligence and morality, the desirability
and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly
outweigh the desirability of avoiding the
injury sought to be prevented by the statute
defining the offense in issue.
(2) The necessity and justifiability of
conduct under subsection (1) of this section
shall not rest upon considerations pertaining
only to the morality and advisability of the
statute, either in its general application or
with respect to its application to a
particular class of cases arising thereunder.
When evidence relating to the defense of
justification under this section is offered
by the defendant, before it is submitted for
the consideration of the jury, the court
shall first rule as a matter of law whether
the claimed facts and circumstances would, if
established, constitute a justification.
18-1-702 Colo. Rev. Statutes (1973) (Emphasis added).
The Colorado court amplified the requirement of this
judicial review in the case of People v. Strock, 623 P.2d
(Colo. 1981).

Here the Supreme Court of Colorado stated:

Before the choice of evils defense may be
invoked, it must first be shown that the
defendant's conduct was necessitated by a
specific and imminent threat of injury to his
person under circumstances which left him no
reasonable and viable alternative other than
violation of the law for which he stands
charged. Moreover, as a condition to the
admission of evidence relating to the choice
of evils defense, a proper foundation must be
laid as indicated by the underlined wording
in the statute.
Id. p. 44 (emphasis added).
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standard, only the element regarding preventing a
significant evil (hospital transport of an ill person) could
even be remotely claimed as satisfied.

However, even if one

used the evidence in light most favorable to the defendantBuxton, he failed to present a prima facie defense for jury
consideration.
For example, the defendant's case clearly does not meet
the second requirement:
alternative."

"There must have been no adequate

The record is undisputed that there were

other sober drivers present when Mr. Thomas first began to
have difficulties.

(R. 81.)

Mr. Goodrich had not consumed

any alcohol and could drive a car.

(R. 87, 90.)

As a

friend of defendant-Buxton, he indicated that he felt he
could not leave because he had to tend his children, but his
ex-girlfriend was present and could have looked after the
children.

Also, the defendant, Mr. Buxton (who Mr. Goodrich

trusted) could have watched the children while Mr. Goodrich
drove Mr. Thomas to the hospital or Mr. Goodrich could have
taken the children and the ill person to the hospital.

(R.

89, 90, 92.).
Additionally, although Mr. Goodrich testified, that
there was no phone in the house, someone could have used a
neighbor's phone or one of the numerous phones available to
summon assistance.

(R. 89, 55.)

Furthermore, Officer Kirk

testified there were pedestrians present that evening, any
one of which could have summoned help or driven the car, if
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demonstration that from an objectively reasonable basis
there existed no reasonable alternative to violating the
law.
Similarly it is incumbent upon the defendant to
establish that the harm caused must not be disproportionate
to the harm avoided.

In the instant case, the defendant-

Buxton chose to drive a car with a breath alcohol content of
.202, some two and one-half times greater than the statutory
level of .08.

His performance on the field sobriety tests

and his driving pattern clearly indicates that he was not
capable of safely operating a motor vehicle.

Further,

evidence of his inability was that he chose to drive an ill
individual to the hospital while in an intoxicated state,
rather than phone for help at the nearest phone or have one
of the non-intoxicated persons present drive to the
hospital.
The defendant, not only endangered his own life, but
that of Mr. Thomas and the lives of numerous pedestrians and
occupants in other vehicles that were present by running a
red light and speeding.

(R. 21)

It is this type of danger

that has led the legislature to pass and enforce driving
under the influence laws.

The harm of the defendant

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence is
clearly disproportionate to harm which was to be avoided.
A careful review of the three requirements essential
for the defendant to be allowed to submit the defense of
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not overturn a jur y verdict where there exists wii.-dess
error

I t stated:
We revei: s =s :>i: :i 11 y if an er roi: erodes our
fl
confidei ice ii i the outcome", and we conclude

that absent the error, a different outcome
was reasonably likely.
State v. Wareham, supra at p. 15, citing State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).
It is respectfully submitted that even reading
defendant-Buxton's brief in the most favorable light, he has
failed to overcome the strong presumption of a jury
verdict's validity.

He has not demonstrated that a

different outcome was reasonably likely.

As such, the jury

verdict should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The defendant has raised the argument that he has been
denied equal protection of the law because he was not given
a warning that he could have an independent alcohol test,
while persons who initially refuse to submit to a breath
test are advised of the availability of an independent test.
This argument erroneously assumes that persons refusing to
take the breath test are in the same class as those agreeing
to take the breath test.

Those persons who refuse are

subject to loss of their driver's license for a period of
one year, unlike those persons agreeing to submit to the
test.

Furthermore, it is necessary to give an additional

incentive to submit to the test to those individuals who
initially refuse the test.
Defendant's argument must also fail because any "right"
which may be given to a defendant for an independent blood

test would only apply in the civil driverfs license
revocation proceeding and not in the criminal prosecution of
the defendant for DUI because the statutory authority for an
independent test is civil and not criminal.
Even assuming arguendo that a right to an independent
chemical test exists in a criminal proceeding, the failure
of a police officer to inform the defendant of this right is
not a denial of due process.

Individuals are presumed to

know the law and failure to provide notice of all possible
defenses does not deprive the defendant of due process of
law.
The defendant also argues that the trial court should
have submitted the defense of necessity to the jury.
argument must fail for the following reasons:
not recognize the defense of necessity.

This

Utah law does

The Utah

Legislature has not provided for the defense and it would
not be within this Court's power to judicially legislate
such a defense.
Furthermore, even if this Court did recognize the
defense of necessity, the defense requires the defendant to
establish the prima facie elements of the necessity defense.
The defendant has failed to establish that there was no
other reasonable alternative and that the harm avoided
outweighs the harm caused.
Even if the defense of necessity was submitted to the
jury, there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict

of not guilty by reason of necessity and ample evidence to
support the conviction for DUI.

Therefore, any error which

may have been committed by the trial court was harmless.
The verdict of guilty should not be overturned and the
defendant's conviction should be upheld.
DATED this

<

7 ^

day of May, 1989.

Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for Respondent
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APPENDIX A

ELD SOBRIETY TESTS: (Describe subject's actions)
/

5. .
Were tests demonstrated by officer?

'x«r—*

Subject's ability to follow instructions

SEARCHES
A.
Vehicle:
Was subject's vehicle searched? M t ^ s
Where? ^ ^ - S V '
WhPn^ %2»M-'*"->
Evidence e^Q^v;
^-—rS ^
c^
Person who performed the search
B.

^> v T "

<rz

Q^rs

N >x.

y\ N , ^ —

.

W^fSV*^

Subject:
^
<TV_^_
Was subject's, person s e a r c h e d t ^ H i £ i ! _ _ Where? t==!:^:::- ^ ^ ^
i———:
When?
—_lCr--__
Evidence Found W > \ s > ; ^ <y^ v —u e W c G O
Person who performed the search
j p * ^ v ft /

^u^L

^VCgvL,

CHEMICAL TESTS:
' M r . or Mrs. t / I : VTTSx ,
, do you understand that you are under arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) T
\ . \V( V ^ - X ' S T ^ >Jt .
I hereby request that you submit tjLa chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) (jontent of your blood. I
request that you take a
V ^ C ^ W ^
test
V 0 x - (^—
N^. +
(blood-breath-urine)
Lr

The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was administered:
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood
alcohol content or presences drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may,
result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.

What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response:

M ^

"

Did subject submit to a dnemicaJ test? X ^ ^ * . _ Type of test
\ ^ 1 \ ^ ^
v <
Test Administered by ^
A v^C^r^ -\ ^ A t p r v ^ Where?
A ^ ^ *"o
Time:_2AAlSL:
Results ^~2CD~2_Was subject notified of results? A"C^>
Serial No. of test machine:

^ ^ - C O U M O
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following)

•

The following admonition-was given by me to the subject:
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, howSvefU^nust warn you that if you refuse, your license or
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year wr^uogprovision for a limited driver's license.
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physiclan-ai^ur own choice administer
-a tpst at vnifr own ovnonsp in addition to the one I have requested you to suoTntUo, so long as it does

